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Abstract
Background: The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgment have been the focus of
extensive recent research. Here we show that serotonin transporter (5-HTTLPR) genotype predicts responses to moral
dilemmas featuring foreseen harm to an innocent.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Participants in this study judged the acceptability of actions that would unintentionally
or intentionally harm an innocent victim in order to save others’ lives. An analysis of variance revealed a genotype 6
scenario interaction, F(2, 63)=4.52, p=.02. Results showed that, relative to long allele homozygotes (LL), carriers of the short
(S) allele showed particular reluctance to endorse utilitarian actions resulting in foreseen harm to an innocent individual. LL
genotype participants rated perpetrating unintentional harm as more acceptable (M=4.98, SEM=0.20) than did SL
genotype participants (M=4.65, SEM=0.20) or SS genotype participants (M=4.29, SEM=0.30). No group differences in
moral judgments were observed in response to scenarios featuring intentional harm.
Conclusions/Significance: The results indicate that inherited variants in a genetic polymorphism that influences serotonin
neurotransmission influence utilitarian moral judgments as well. This finding is interpreted in light of evidence that the S
allele is associated with elevated emotional responsiveness.
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Introduction
Judging moral dilemmas typically requires weighing the relative
merits of two mutually exclusive outcomes, such as choosing to
save many lives even if doing so requires the death of an innocent
person. In the face of actual moral dilemmas, individuals’
judgments about the optimal course of action to be taken can
vary widely [1]. For example, medical researchers investigating
new drugs may disagree about the moral acceptability of enrolling
patients in the placebo arm of clinical trials when it can be
foreseen that some of these patients may suffer or die prematurely
as a result [2]. The present study assesses a possible source of
variation among individuals who are judging moral dilemmas. We
assessed whether genetic variants associated with serotonergic
function predict responses to moral dilemmas featuring foreseen
and intentional harm.
As is true for actual moral dilemmas, judging moral dilemmas in
the laboratory frequently requires weighing alternate outcomes,
such as choosing to save many lives by allowing an innocent victim
to die. Saving more lives is the more utilitarian option, but the
prospect of causing harm to an innocent individual may generate a
strong emotional response [3]. Nonetheless, respondents may
endorse harming an individual for utilitarian gains when the harm
is impersonal rather than personal, or unintentional rather than
intentional [4,5].
Recent research demonstrates that participants’ willingness to
endorse utilitarian actions that require personally harming an
innocent victim can be affected by variables that influence brain
functioning, such as lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
and pharmacological challenges [6,7]. For example, respondents
who receive a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (citalopram)
are less likely to endorse utilitarian outcomes that result in harm to
an innocent victim [7]. This may be because serotonin enhances
the aversive emotional response to causing others harm, perhaps
through its influence on brain structures like the amygdala, insula,
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which are implicated in moral
judgments and behavior [6,8].
Endogenous serotonin neurotransmission is influenced by a
functional 59 promoter polymorphism of the serotonin trans-
porter (5-HTT) in the human serotonin transporter gene
SLC6A4,c a l l e d5-HTTLPR [9]. Relative to carriers of the long
(L) form of the polymorphism, carriers of the short (S) form show
reduced transcription, expression and function of 5-HTT, which
influences the reuptake of serotonin from the synaptic cleft [10].
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e25148S-carriers are also more emotionally reactive to aversive stimuli
than are L-carriers [11]. This difference may reflect S-carriers’
increased activation in subcortical structures like the amygdala
that are associated with negative affect and/or reduced
prefrontal modulation of these structures by the prefrontal
cortex [11].
Intentional and foreseen harm are distinguished by the principle
of double effect [12]. This principle stipulates that foreseen harm that
is a side effect (or ‘‘double effect’’) of bringing about a good result
may be permissible. By contrast, intentionally causing harm as a
means of bringing about the good end would not be permissible.
For example, scenarios in which one moves a switch to divert a
train onto a track away from five bystanders, even though it can be
foreseen that another person standing on the track will be killed,
are usually judged to be permissible. But scenarios in which one
moves a switch to drop a person in front of a train, deliberately
killing him but saving five people further down the track, are
usually judged to be impermissible. We hypothesized that 5-
HTTLPR genotype would interact with intentionality in respon-
dents who generated moral judgments. Whereas we predicted that
all participants would eschew intentionally harming an innocent
for utilitarian gains, we predicted that participants’ judgments of
foreseen but unintentional harm would diverge as a function of
genotype. Specifically, we predicted that LL homozygotes would
adhere to the principle of double effect and preferentially select the
utilitarian option to save more lives despite unintentional harm to
an innocent victim, whereas S-allele carriers would be less likely to
endorse even unintentional harm. Results of behavioral testing
confirmed this hypothesis.
Results
We examined participants’ moral judgments using analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with genotype as a between-subjects factor
and scenario type as a within-subjects factor. When significant
main effects or interactions were found, we conducted post hoc t
tests. Significant differences were set at p,.05 (two-tailed). We first
conducted a 2 (intentionality)63 (genotype) ANOVA assessing
participants’ responses regarding moral acceptability.
Moral judgments
In line with predictions, a significant 2 (foreseen, intentional)63
(SS, SL, and LL genotype) interaction effect emerged, F(2,
63)=4.52, p=.02. Tolerance of foreseen harm to a victim varied
linearly with genotype (Figure 1). Homozygous L-carriers judged
saving five people and causing the foreseen death of an innocent
person to be more acceptable than did homozygous S-carriers,
t(33)=2.03, p=.05. Foreseen harm to an innocent victim was
judged to be more acceptable than morally neutral actions by
homozyogous L-carriers, t(21)=4.24, p,.001, and heterozygotes,
t(29)=2.14, p=.04. By contrast, homozygous S-carriers judged
dilemmas in which harm was foreseen to be no better than morally
neutral dilemmas, t(12)=20.07, p=.94. Finally, the difference in
homozygous L-carriers’ responses to scenarios featuring foreseen
harm over intentional harm was greater than for homozygous S-
carriers, t(33)=2.34, p=.03, suggesting LL homozygotes saw a
greater moral distinction between the two types of scenarios. As
predicted, participants consistently rejected the perpetration of
intentional harm to a victim; no group differences were observed
in response to these scenarios (all p..90). No group differences
were observed in response to neutral scenarios (all p..60) or other
comparison dilemmas (all p..10).
Response times
It has previously been observed that heightened response
conflict during moral decision making is associated with longer
response times [4,5]. We thus conducted a 2 (intentionality)63
(genotype) ANOVA assessing participants’ median response times
across all response options when they judged foreseen and
intentional harm scenarios. A marginally significant main effect
of intentionality, F(1, 62)=3.37, p=.07, reflected longer response
times to foreseen harm scenarios (M=6836 milliseconds,
SD=2246) than intentional harm scenarios (M=6540 millisec-
onds, SD=2612). No main effect of group or interaction was
observed (p..10).
More important for our specific hypotheses, we also analyzed
variation in response times when participants made different
responses. In other words, how did participants’ response times
vary as a function of how acceptable they judged a course of action
to be? To conduct this analysis, we calculated for each participant
the correlation between his or her mean response times and the
numeric response (1–7) he or she provided for both foreseen and
intentional harm scenarios. Thus, a positive correlation indicated
that the participant responded more slowly when judging actions
to be more acceptable, and a negative correlation indicated that
participants responded more slowly when judging the action to be
less acceptable. We performed a Fisher transformation on these
coefficients to normalize their distribution and compared the
resulting coefficients across groups for intentional and foreseen
harm using a 2 (intentionality)63 (genotype) ANOVA. An
intentionality 6 genotype interaction emerged, F(2, 58)=3.42,
p=.04. In accordance with findings for moral judgments, group
differences in response times emerged only when participants
judged foreseen harm. Examination of the means indicated that
only the responses of homozygous L-carriers varied as a function
of response. These participants showed slower response latencies
the less acceptable they judged foreseen harm to be (M=20.74,
SD=0.69). No relationship between response selection and
response times was observed for S-carriers (all M,0.15). No main
effect of group was found. These patterns suggest that LL
homozygotes experienced increased response conflict, and hence
delayed response times, when their responses contradicted the
principle of double effect.
Figure 1. Mean judgments of the moral acceptability of
intended, neutral, and foreseen harm by 5-HTTLPR genotype.
Error bars denote standard error. Acceptability judgments of foreseen
harm scenarios varied linearly with genotype.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025148.g001
Genotype and Moral Judgments
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Accumulating research suggests that serotonergic activity plays
an important role in moral reasoning and related social behaviors
[7,13]. SLC6A4 is a gene that regulates serotonergic activity and
has been described as the most investigated genetic variant in the
fields of human psychology and neuroscience [14]. However, the
association between 5-HTTLPR genotype and individual differ-
ences in moral judgments has not previously been determined.
Our results showed that participants agreed that intentionally
causing the death of one innocent victim was not a morally
acceptable means to a utilitarian end. By contrast, participants’
judgments diverged according to genotype when judging foreseen
harm. Here, homozygotic carriers of the S allele, which is
associated with heightened emotional reactivity and reduced
prefrontal regulation of emotion, were less likely than L-carriers to
endorse saving many lives if one person would be unintentionally
harmed as a result. LL genotype participants judged foreseen
harm to be more acceptable, and they responded more slowly
when judging foreseen harm to be unacceptable, suggesting
increased response conflict in these trials. These findings support
our hypothesis that LL genotype participants’ moral judgments are
more strongly modulated by assessments of intentionality.
These results may aid in understanding why people disagree
about the acceptability of causing foreseen harm to meet utilitarian
goals. The results of the present study suggest that judgments in
response to this kind of moral dilemma may be influenced by
inherited variants in a genetic polymorphism that influences
serotonin neurotransmission and patterns of responding to socio-
emotional stimuli. These findings thus extend previous research in
two domains. First, they advance our understanding of how
variations of the 5-HTTLPR influence social cognition. Second,
they indicate that a genetic ‘‘manipulation’’ consistently associated
with increased emotional responsiveness (the S allele) results in
significantly greater reluctance to cause harm to another
individual even though others will be helped, and even though
harming the innocent is an unintentional aspect of helping. This
helps to extend our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
moral judgments.
Serotonin function has long been associated with variations in
personality and in patterns of affective responding [14]. 5-
HTTLPR S-carriers have been characterized as high in negative
affectivity [15], which is defined as a bias toward negatively
valenced information and sensitivity to perceived threat [16]. The
results of neuroimaging studies suggest that this pattern of
responding results from enhanced reactivity of the amygdala to
negatively valenced stimuli and/or reduced modulation of this
activity by the prefrontal cortex [11]. In the present paradigm, we
speculate that these patterns of neural responding, and consequent
increased emotional responsiveness (in this case to the plight of the
innocent victim), are reflected in S-carriers’ reluctance to condone
even unintentional harm to an innocent victim despite the
possibility of utilitarian gains.
To draw stronger conclusions about the mechanism by which
genotype affects moral judgments, it would be optimal to
specifically assess correlates of affective responding during moral
judgments in S and L-carriers, for example, via psychophysiolog-
ical or self-report measures of affective responding. Such
paradigms could provide support for the notion that the prospect
of harming an innocent victim generates an aversive emotional
response [3], one that may be enhanced in S-carriers. Neuroim-
aging studies of the amygdala and prefrontal cortex in S and L-
carriers could also test the hypothesis that harming innocents will
generate increased amygdala responses in S-carriers relative to LL
homozygotes—particularly in response to unintentional but
foreseen harm scenarios.
It should be noted that the patterns of response times we
observed suggested that LL homozygotes experienced increased
response conflict when their responses contradicted the doctrine of
double effect, whereas S-carriers did not show consistent
differences in response time across conditions. Previous research
has demonstrated that when participants judge harming an
innocent victim to be acceptable their response latencies are
usually slower than when they judge these items to be
unacceptable. It has been argued that the emotional response
elicited by the prospect of harming an innocent renders the
‘‘unacceptable’’ response the prepotent or dominant response,
which then must be overcome when an item is ultimately judged to
be acceptable [4]. In the present study, LL homozygotes were
significantly more likely than S-carriers to judge actions that
resulted in unintentional but foreseen harm to an innocent victim
to be acceptable. In other words, judging these actions to be
acceptable appeared to be LL homozygotes’ dominant response.
In addition, LL homozygotes’ response latencies were slower the
less acceptable they judged foreseen harm to be. This suggests that
LL homozygotes responded significantly more slowly the more
their responses diverged from their dominant response. This result
is consistent with suggestions that response latencies increase
under conditions of cognitive conflict [17]. The source of this
cognitive conflict cannot be determined definitively from the
present paradigm, but it may reflect conflict resulting from the
integration of affective responses to harm with information about
intentionality.
Recent findings resulting from a paradigm similar to that used
in this paper suggest that manipulating the serotonin system
influences moral judgments in response to dilemmas featuring
personal harm [7]. A strength of the present investigation is that it
demonstrates that serotonergic function affects moral reasoning
using a distinct set of moral scenarios than those that have been
used in several previous studies assessing neuropsychological
correlates of moral reasoning [5,6]. The present findings thus
support the generalizability of these prior findings. It should also
be noted, however, that it is difficult to directly compare studies in
which available serotonin is acutely manipulated with those in
which serotonin transporter genotype varies because the mecha-
nism by which 5-HTTLPR genotype affects serotonergic function
is not yet well understood [18]. The polymorphism’s most
important role may be in modulating responsiveness to stress
during development [14]. A precise molecular account of the role
of 5-HTTLPR genotype in moral judgments therefore awaits
further characterization. Combining genetic association tech-
niques with acute serotonin manipulation may further elucidate
the role of serotonin in moral reasoning, given the known
interaction between 5-HTTLPR genotype and available serotonin
levels in emotional responding [17]. However, the current results
extend prior observations that moral reasoning can be influenced
by pharmaceutical challenges and damage to the brain, finding
that individual differences in moral reasoning can also be
influenced by inherited genetic variants.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixty-five healthy volunteers (27 males, 38 females, M
age=26.1 years, SD=6.7) took part in this investigation.
Participants were recruited via fliers placed in the community
that invited them to take part in mental health research.
Participants included twenty-two LL genotype subjects, thirty SL
Genotype and Moral Judgments
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underwent screening at the National Institutes of Health via a
standardized psychiatric interview using DSM-IV criteria, a
medical history and physical exam performed by a clinician, and
blood and urine screening tests. No participants exhibiting current
or past major affective disorder, anxiety disorder, psychotic
disorder, substance dependence, anorexia nervosa or bulimia
were included. Participants were free of psychotropic medications
at the time of screening. Urine toxicity screens excluded
participants in whom recent drug use was indicated. The matrix
reasoning and verbal subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of
Intelligence were administered to obtain estimated IQ scores and
participants with scores ,80 were excluded. No IQ differences
across groups were observed (all p..20). All participants gave
informed written consent and were paid for their participation.
Ethics Statement
This research was approved by the Combined Neuroscience
Institutional Review Board at the National Institute of Mental
Health, and all participants’ written informed consent was
obtained prior to the study’s commencement.
Genotype analysis
DNA for each subject was prepared from saliva samples using
OrageneNDNA kits (DNA Genotek, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada).
SLC6A4 gene promoter (5-HTTLPR) polymorphism was amplified
from 10 ng genomic DNA in a 20 ml reaction: 16 Optimized
Buffer A, 16PCR enhancer, and 0.25 mM each primer (Forward
FAM-ATCGCTCCTGCATCCCCCATTAT and Reverse GA-
GGTGCAGGGGGATGCTGGAA), 0.125 mM dNTP, 10 ng
DNA, 1.25 u Platinum Taq polymerase (all Invitrogen Corp).
The PCR conditions were 95uC (5 min), 40 cycles of 94uC
(30 sec), 52uC (30 sec), 68uC (1 min), and a final elongation, 68uC
(10 min). S (103 bp) and L (146 bp) genotypes were discriminated
directly from the PCR reaction products. Samples were mixed
with deionized formamide and GeneScanTM-500 ROX Size
Standard (Applied Biosystems), and genotypes resolved on a 3730
DNA Analyzer (Applied Biosystems). Genotyping accuracy was
determined empirically by duplicate genotyping of 25% of the
samples selected randomly. The error rate was ,.005, and the
completion rate was ..95.
Procedure
Participants made judgments on a set of 150 moral dilemmas,
consisting of five versions of 30 distinct scenarios (Table S1). The
five versions included two groups of moral scenarios that varied in
the intentionality of the harm caused to the victim by the proposed
action: intentional harm (N=30) and foreseen harm (N=30). In
the versions featuring unintentional harm, saving five lives would
mean the foreseen but unintentional death of an innocent victim,
for example: pushing a tree into a boulder’s path to divert the
boulder away from five people but onto an innocent victim. In the
intentional harm scenarios, killing the innocent victim was an
intentional element of saving five others, for example: pushing
down a tree in which an innocent victim is sitting so the victim falls
into the path of a boulder that is rolling toward five people. Both
intentional harm and foreseen harm versions of each scenario
featured an identical action to be taken by the participant (for
example, pushing down a tree, throwing a switch, or turning a
wheel). There were also three non-moral control scenarios: neutral
(e.g., pushing a tree so that it will knock a boulder away, enabling
access to a path); no gain (e.g., pushing a tree to knock a person
into a boulder’s path without any gain to others); and no cost (e.g.,
pushing a tree to knock a boulder so that it will not hit five people
without any cost to anyone else).
Initial validation of these stimuli was accomplished by presenting
the stimuli to an independent group of thirteen subjects and
assessing ratings of moral acceptability. Actions described in the
foreseen harm scenarios were rated as significantly more acceptable
than the actions described in intended harm scenarios (means were
4.9 and 4.4 on a 7-point scale); t(12)=4.36, p,.001).
In the present study, the text of each scenario was presented on
three consecutive screens. The first two screens described the
hypothetical scenario and the third presented a question about the
action to be taken (‘‘How acceptable would it be to….’’).
Participants pressed numeric keys 1 (least acceptable) through 7
(most acceptable) to answer each question. The task was self-paced.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Example scenarios. Three examples are provided
for each of the five types of moral dilemmas viewed by study
participants.
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